There are actually some advantages to solicitors using agency, says judge
The High Court has upheld a senior circuit judge’s decision that a claimant did not need to break down an interpreter’s fee to show the agency cost so as to recover it.
Mr Justice Moody said there were actually “some advantages” to solicitors using an agency.
The ruling in Motor Insurers’ Bureau v Santiago [2026] EWHC 513 (KB) halts the bid to extend the ongoing argument over the recoverability of agency fees charged for medical reports to interpreter fees.
The claimant in the underlying claim was a Portuguese-speaking Brazilian who was involved in a road traffic accident while working as a delivery driver. The claim settled on the day of trial but a question about recoverability of the interpreters’ fees as a disbursement in fixed-costs cases went to the Court of Appeal.
It held in 2023 that, where an independent interpreter was essential to enable a party or witness to participate fully in proceedings or give their best evidence, their reasonable fee was recoverable as a disbursement under CPR 45.29I(h).
The case was remitted to the county court for any challenge as to the quantum of the fee, £770 plus VAT, a total of £924.
The MIB argued the court should either assess the fee at nil, because of the claimant’s failure to provide a breakdown as to its composition, or should reduce it to £300 (including VAT) on the grounds that the sum claimed was excessive – this was the interpreter’s rate when approached directly.
He was booked via Professional and Legal Services (PALS), a sister company of the claimant’s solicitors, Bond Turner. Its fee note did not break down the charge, although its KC accepted that the interpreter would have been paid “substantially less” than £924.
HHJ Dight did not consider the interests of transparency required a breakdown. He accepted that it was not unreasonable in principle to seek the services of an interpreter from a company rather than from an individual, and this would mean paying towards the overheads and profits of the service supplier.
But finding the figure “slightly high”, he reduced the fee to £794.40.
On appeal, Moody J said: “The MIB’s argument is that the PALS invoice includes a disguised element of solicitors’ profit costs or an agency element and so therefore a breakdown was required. In agreement with the judge below, I reject this submission.
“Interpretation services are (per Crane) not services for which a solicitor carries personal responsibility to the client. In my judgment, there is nothing wrong with interpreter services being provided via a company.”
He said there may be some advantages in providing services this way. “For example, the company may provide cover for illness or the provision of a ‘stable’ of interpreters of differing levels of expertise and experience.
“It is clear from the evidence… that there is a number of companies that provide interpreter services. It is inevitable that only part of the sum paid to the company will end up in the pocket of the interpreter. That does not mean that the sum not paid to the interpreter is an outsourced profit cost or impermissible agency element.”
“If there had been no common ownership then it seems unlikely that a breakdown would have been requested and I can see no reason why one would have been necessary.”
While there may be cases where a breakdown was necessary to establish the reasonableness of the fee charged, “it is a question of fact in any particular case… in order to enable the court to perform its task”. Here the judge had all the information he needed without a breakdown.
As to whether the sum HHJ Dight allowed was reasonable and proportionate, Moody J found no error of law in his approach.
“This was an evaluative judgment reached by an experienced judge who will himself no doubt have conducted summary assessments after trials in London and which included claims for interpreters’ charges.
“Indeed, it was no doubt for precisely that reason that the Court of Appeal remitted this issue to the designated civil judge. He reached a conclusion which was plainly open to him on the facts.”
Robert Marven KC (instructed by Keoghs) for the appellant. Benjamin Williams KC (instructed by Bond Turner) for the respondent.